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Crestor, an important but controversial cholesterol-lowering drug, is contraindicated
for use by senior and Asian patients. In this paper, we exploit this fact along with a
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patients. We find strong evidence for the informative-detailing hypothesis: relative to
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1 Introduction
Pharmaceutical companies spend tremendous resources to promote their drugs. For
example, in 2003, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry spent around $6 billion on “detail-
ing” (Schweitzer (2007, pg. 85)): drug-company representatives’ promotional visits to
physicians’ offices and hospitals. The huge promotional expenditures in pharmaceutical
markets is a cause of concern, especially given the asymmetric information characteriz-
ing the drug prescription relationship between physicians and patients, and the potential
for drug companies to sway physicians to prescribe drugs that may not be in patients’
best interests.
In this paper, we explore the nature of these promotional office visits. In particular,
we focus on detailing related to a particular cholesterol-lowering drug, Astra-Zeneca’s
Crestor (active ingredient rosuvastatin), during a period following its introduction to
the market. Crestor’s launch in late 2003 was accompanied by a huge marketing cam-
paign. While this is typical for many new drugs, Crestor’s case is noteworthy because,
apparently, its marketing push was deemed sufficiently excessive—relative to Crestor’s
perceived therapeutic benefits—to warrant a highly critical editorial in The Lancet, the
flagship British medical journal:
AstraZeneca’s tactics in marketing its cholesterol-lowering drug, rosuvas-
tatin, raise disturbing questions about how drugs enter clinical practice
and what measures exist to protect patients from inadequately investigated
medicines.1
Given the controversy surrounding Crestor’s marketing campaign and the policy
concerns arising from the potential agency conflicts between physicians and patients, it
is interesting to look for evidence of detailing’s benefits vis-a-vis this drug. Our investi-
gation exploits a unique dataset containing records of detailing visits and prescriptions
of cholesterol-lowering statin drugs at the individual physician level. This dataset, as
well as medical features of the pharmaceutical prescription process, allow us to assess
whether Crestor’s detailing plays a beneficial role of providing information to physicians.
In our analysis, we exploit the contraindications indicated for Crestor. The basic
intuition underlying our tests is straightforward. Suppose that detailing provides physi-
1From The Lancet (2003).
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cians with contraindication information for which they had no prior knowledge, and
that detailing otherwise has no impact on physicians’ prescription decisions. Then, de-
tailing should make physicians less likely to prescribe the drug to the contraindicated
patients. For Crestor, senior patients and patients of Asian descent are specifically
contraindicated. So, under the above (very restrictive) assumptions, an intuitive test
of informative detailing is to see whether physicians who have been detailed prescribe
Crestor less often to these two types of patients than do physicians who have not been
detailed. Our formal tests for informative detailing follow the intuitive idea but allow
for, among other complicating factors: 1) that physicians, on average, may have some
prior (mis)knowledge about the contraindications, and 2) that detailing may have a
direct impact on physicians’ general willingness to prescribe Crestor (besides the effect
of providing the contraindication information).
We find strong evidence for the informativeness of detailing. Our tests strongly reject
the null hypothesis of detailing being uninformative or purely persuasive. Our results
are robust to the possibility of detailing being correlated with unobserved factors such
as physicians’ characteristics and/or their evolving attitude toward Crestor. Finally, to
check the face validity of our test strategy, we perform “placebo tests” on some non-
contraindicated patient groups. For these cases, we do not find similar patterns in our
analysis, confirming the soundness of the basic idea underlying our tests.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature on
testing the informativeness of advertising (broadly defined). Section 3 presents our
empirical model and our tests. Section 4 contains a short description of the market for
the statin class of cholesterol-lowering drugs and the patient types contraindicated for
Crestor, according to the Food and Drug Administration’s recommendations. It also
introduces the data used in our analysis. Section 5 presents the estimation and test
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
Even though detailing is traditionally regarded as sales instead of advertising, it may
also be viewed as a form of advertising in a broad sense. In this section, we relate our
paper to the broader literature on the possible informative effects of advertising. The
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advertising literature has drawn a distinction between the informative and persuasive
effects of advertising. Informative advertising informs consumers about the prices and
characteristics of the available products, while persuasive advertising is modeled as
advertising that simply raises their willingness-to-pay for the advertised product. Well-
known theoretical treatments of persuasive advertising include Dixit and Norman’s
(1978) provocative paper on the welfare effects of advertising, while Butters (1977) and
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) provide models of purely informative advertising. See
Bagwell (2007) for a thorough survey of the literature.
However, the signaling models of advertising (cf. Nelson (1974), Kihlstrom and Ri-
ordan (1984), Milgrom and Roberts (1986)) point out that, in vertically-differentiated
(i.e., quality-differentiated) product markets in which consumers are ill-informed re-
garding the relative qualities of the competing products, the effects of persuasive and
informative advertising can be observationally equivalent. This is because in separating
equilibria of these models, only high-quality firms undertake advertising, so that adver-
tising is strictly informative regarding quality differences between competing products.
Therefore, if product quality enters consumers’ utility functions, advertising informs
consumers that it is high-quality, and thus raises their willingness-to-pay, just as in the
case of persuasive advertising.
This potential observational equivalence between persuasive and informative adver-
tising makes it difficult to empirically test between them. The existing empirical work
has addressed this question in both reduced-form and structural fashion. One impor-
tant example of the reduced-form approach is Ackerberg (2001), which overcomes the
observational equivalence problem by focusing on a market for a new good (a new brand
of yogurt). By investigating whether advertising has a larger effect on consumers who
have tried the new brand or on those who have not, it is able to distinguish between
persuasive and informative advertising.
Examples of the structural approach to this question include Erdem and Keane
(1996), Ackerberg (2003), and Anand and Shachar (2011).2 These papers consider a
Bayesian-learning model, where consumers who are uninformed about the quality of a
product learn about it through advertising. In this structural approach, the distinction
between persuasive and informative advertising is modeled parametrically: persuasive
2See also Chan and Hamilton (2006) for a similar approach to patient learning in drug trials.
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advertising enters consumers’ utility functions directly, while informative advertising
provides a signal that allows consumers to updates their beliefs regarding product qual-
ity.
While our approach is more reduced-form, the starting point of our analysis is closest
to Anand and Shachar’s (2011) paper. Particularly, like Anand and Shachar (2011) and
unlike Ackerberg (2001) (and the signaling literature), our paper focuses on advertis-
ing’s role in horizontally-differentiated product markets, where the relative qualities of
the competing products vary across consumers. In horizontally-differentiated markets,
persuasive and informative advertising are no longer observationally equivalent: while
persuasive advertising would still encourage higher usage across all consumers, infor-
mative advertising would encourage higher usage only by those consumers for which
the advertised products is a good match. For consumers who are ill-matched to the
product, strictly informative advertising should actually discourage use. Anand and
Shachar (2011), in the context of a structural model of TV program choice, uses this
insight to examine the role of advertising on television viewers’ choice of programs to
watch. Here, our paper uses a similar intuition to assess whether advertising has in-
formative effects, by examining whether advertising increases or decreases physicians’
probabilities of prescribing Crestor to contraindicated patients, relative to their other
patients, after controlling for advertising’s general positive impact for all patients.
This paper also utilizes a unique dataset containing information on prescription and
exposure to detailing at the individual physician level. In particular, the availability
of physician-level advertising exposure information distinguishes our paper from most
others that focus on the pharmaceutical prescription process (Stern (1996), Ellison,
Cockburn, Griliches, and Hausman (1997), Coscelli and Shum (2004), Crawford and
Shum (2005), Ching (2010), Ching and Ishihara (2012), Ching, Clark, Horstmann, and
Lim (2015)). For example, Ching and Ishihara (2012) measures the persuasive and
informative effects of detailing using aggregate data of market shares and the detailing
of an angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor from Canada. It identifies detailing’s
persuasive effect as its impact on the market shares of drugs with the same chemicals
but different brands, and the informative effect as detailing’s impact on the market
shares of different chemicals. Ching, Clark, Horstmann, and Lim (2015) studies the
effect of publicity and its interaction with detailing on demand for statin drugs, using
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data on monthly prescription and detailing at the product level.
Narayanan and Manchanda (2009) and Shapiro (2017) utilizes data from the same
source as this paper does, but on different drug markets. Narayanan and Manchanda
(2009) focuses on estimating a Bayesian learning model with physician-specific learning
parameters to accommodate physicians’ heterogeneous learning rates. Shapiro (2017)
estimates the impact of detailing on off-label prescriptions. It finds that detailing
slightly shifts prescriptions from off-label to on-label, consistent with our finding of
detailing containing information about contraindications. Chintagunta, Jiang, and Jin
(2009) incorporates adverse news events into their learning model of prescriptions in the
Cox-2 Inhibitors market, but the role of detailing is not the main focus of their paper.
3 Empirical Model and Tests
Our tests of the informativeness of detailing are based on examining the relationship
between detailing and contraindicated drug prescriptions. We start by setting up a
simple econometric framework to relate Crestor prescription decisions to detailing and
other factors.
Let us assume that there are two types of patients: the contraindicated patients and
non-contraindicated patients. Let subscript a denote the contraindicated type; subscript
na denote the non-contraindicated type; At be an indicator variable for a period-t pa-
tient being the contraindicated type; and dt be a binary variable that indicates whether
a physician is being detailed in period t. Let µa,t (µna,t) denote a physician’s expected
match utility from Crestor for a contraindicated (non-contraindicated) patient in pe-
riod t, and µt denote the physician’s expected match utility from Crestor for a general
period-t patient. For the simplicity of notation, we omit the subscript for physicians.
Now assume that the utility of prescribing Crestor to a period t patient can be
measured by the following indirect utility function:
U∗t = h (Zt, µt) + εt,
where Zt is a vector of patient characteristics; εt is a scaler random shock that captures
other unobserved factors affecting the prescription behavior.
The utility of not prescribing Crestor is normalized to zero. Then, the physician
will prescribe Crestor if and only if U∗t exceeds zero. In the estimation, we assume
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that physicians are risk-neutral and that h (Zt, µt) is a linear function of its arguments.
Furthermore, we assume that εt has such a distribution that there is the following linear
probability model for Crestor prescription:
Pr (yt = 1) = µt + Ztα, (1)
where yt equals one if the physician prescribes Crestor for a patient and zero otherwise.
The linear probability model allows us to control for a rich set of fixed effects in the
estimation.
To capture the impact of detailing on each type of patient, we assume the following
transition process for µm,t:
µm,t = µm,t−1 + θm,tdt, (2)
where m ∈ {a, na}, and θm,t measures the impact of the detailing in period t on the
physician’s expected match utility of Crestor for type-m of patients. Intuitively, infor-
mative detailing requires that θa,t < θna,t. Substituting expressions in (2) for µa,t and
µna,t in µt = Atµa,t + (1−At)µna,t, we have:
µt = µna,t−1 + (µa,t−1 − µna,t−1)At + θna,tdt + (θa,t − θna,t)Atdt,
Meanwhile, we can also express µt−1 as follows:
µt−1 = µna,t−1 + (µa,t−1 − µna,t−1)At−1
Substituting in the above expressions for µt and µt−1 in (1), we get the following
Crestor prescription probability model for period t and period t− 1, repsectively:
Pr (yt = 1) = βt0 + βt1At + βt2dt + βt3Atdt + Ztα, (3)
Pr (yt−1 = 1) = βt0 + βt1At−1 + Zt−1α, (4)
where βt1 ≡ µa,t−1−µna,t−1, βt2 ≡ θna,t and βt3 ≡ θa,t− θna,t. The model in (4) above
applies to the periods before the first Crestor detailing visit to the physician.
The above equations suggest that the test against H0 : βt3 ≥ 0 makes an intuitive
(and necessary) test of informative detailing. Our empirical work in this paper focuses
on testing this hypothesis and examining its robustness across various subsamples of
our dataset.
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Another practical issue regarding the test is that, ideally, we want to focus on the
period around the visit at which a detailer may inform a physician about the contraindi-
cations. This is because once a physician is informed about the contraindications during
a detailing visit, future detailing should no longer be informative regarding the issue.
For this reason, we treat our data for each physician as consisting of (at most) two
periods: before and after Crestor’s first detailing visit to each physician.3 With this
approach, the “After” period covers the informative detailing visit to each physician if
one exits, and we can also drop the subscript “t” for the β parameters.
It is worth noting here that the test suggested above represents a very minimum
requirement for informative detailing. The analysis in this paper does not touch on
whether detailing provides objective information for all or most relevant information
for physicians to make sound prescription decisions.
4 Crestor and the Statin Drug Market
In order to implement our test of the informativeness of detailing using data on Crestor
detailing and prescriptions, we need to identify the contraindicated patient types for
the drug. In this section, we first briefly describe the market for the statin class of
cholesterol-lowering drugs (of which Crestor is a member) and then proceed to a more
detailed discussion of the United States Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) rec-
ommendations for Crestor, which we use to pin down contraindicated patient types.
Worldwide, the statin class of cholesterol-lowering drugs constitutes the largest drug
market, in terms of both sales and prescriptions. Statin drugs were introduced in
the mid-1990s, and gained popularity quickly because they led to rapid and dramatic
reductions of blood cholesterol levels in patients. Statins work mainly in the liver by
inhibiting the enzyme HMG-CoA reductase, which triggers increased absorption of low-
density lipoprotein (LDL, also known as “bad cholesterol”) from the bloodstream and
eventual clearance through the kidneys.
Besides Astra-Zeneca’s Crestor, which was introduced in September 2003, the two
other major statin drugs during our sample period were: Pfizer’s Lipitor (atorvastatin),
3There is only the before period for physicians who had not been detailed by the end of the two years
that our data cover.
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introduced in 1996, and Merck’s Zocor (simvastatin), introduced in 1991.4 Because all
statin drugs impose some strain on the liver and kidneys, they are contraindicated for
patients who have liver or kidney damage.
However, because Crestor was a very powerful drug, there were some extra precau-
tions for Crestor. In particular, the FDA label for Crestor, which appeared in its first
form on August 12, 2003, contained a warning regarding patients of Asian descent, who
appeared in clinical studies to retain much higher levels of drug concentration in their
blood, relative to Caucasian users:
Pharmacokinetic studies show an approximate 2-fold elevation in median
exposure in Japanese subjects residing in Japan and in Chinese subjects
residing in Singapore when compared with Caucasians residing in North
America and Europe. No studies directly examining Asian ethnic population
residing in the U.S. are available, so the contribution of environmental and
genetic factors to the observed increase in rosuvastatin drug levels have not
been determined.
In the March 2, 2005 version of the FDA label, this precaution was strengthened,
on the basis of studies on U.S. subjects:
Pharmacokinetic studies, including one conducted in the US, have demon-
strated an approximate 2-fold elevation in median exposure in Asian subjects
when compared with the Caucasian control group.
Furthermore, there is a another warning regarding prescribing Crestor to senior
patients (over age 65), as these patients are more likely to develop myopathy (muscle
pain and weakness),5 severe cases of which have resulted in death in patients taking
Crestor:
Rovustatin should be prescribed with caution in patients with disposing
factors for myopathy, such as renal impairment, advanced age, and hypothy-
roidism.
4Zocor lost patent protection in 2006, and its active ingredient simvastatin is now available in generic
versions.
5See the warning on patients disposed for myopathy in FDA’s approval package from Aug 2003.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1992182 
10
Based on the FDA labels, we define senior patients and patients of Asian descent as
the contraindicated patient types for Crestor in this paper. (For convenience, we will
refer to patients of Asian descent as simply “Asian patients.”) The warning regard-
ing these patients is specific to Crestor and is not present for the other statin drugs.
Though patients with myopathy are also warned about some other statin drugs, senior
(“advanced-age”) patients are specifically warned only about Crestor. If other statin
drugs were also contraindicated for senior patients, how informative detailing would be
reflected in Crestor prescription probabilities would be ambiguous.
4.1 Data
We use a panel dataset comprising prescriptions of statin drugs from a sample of 2400
U.S. physicians.6 The dataset is unique in that, for each physician, we observe a sample
of prescriptions written between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2004, as well as some
characteristics of the patients. The observed patient characteristics allow us to identify
the contraindicated patients. In addition, we also have a record of all the detailing visits
made by pharmaceutical sales representatives during the same period. We construct
our data by combining the prescription data and detailing data. Thus, each observation
in our sample is a prescription for which we observe the patient’s characteristics, the
prescription made by the physician and measures of detailing activity at the physician’s
office. We use the data from Crestor’s approval date, Aug 13, 2003, to the end of 2004
in all of our analysis.
Tables 1 and 2 show the description and the summary statistics of the variables
included in our analysis. The dependent variables are “Crestor (any dosage)” and
“High-dosage Crestor,” which are dummy variables that indicate whether Crestor and
high-dosage (20mg or 40mg) Crestor were prescribed, respectively.7 Both dependent
variables are relevant for our purpose because physicians who are informed about the
6The data are obtained from a pharmaceutical consulting firm, which also provided a similar dataset to
a marketing study by Narayanan and Manchanda (2009). The data include more physicians with higher
prescription volumes relative to the whole U.S. population of physicians. As will become clear later, the
oversampling of high-volume prescribers makes it harder to detect informative detailing.
7There are four dosage forms for Crestor: 5mg, 10mg, 20mg and 40mg. 5mg are considered low dosage,
10mg normal dosage and the 20mg and 40mg high dosages.
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contraindications may react by either being more cautious about prescribing Crestor
to the contraindicated patients in general or by just trying to avoid prescribing the
high-dosage versions to them. (High-dosage) Crestor was prescribed (1.3%) 9.3% of the
time in our data period.
The first set of explanatory variables used in the regression analysis includes mea-
sures of detailing activities at the physician’s office. The dummy variable “After” indi-
cates whether a prescription was made after Crestor’s first detailing visit to the physi-
cian. The date of Crestor’s first detailing visit varies significantly across physicians. For
the 2,400 physicians in our sample, Crestor made the first detailing visit within the first
month of its approval date to 35% of them, and had not made the first detailing visit
to 23% of them by the end of 2004. Of all the prescriptions in our sample, 86.6% are
made after physicians received their first detailing visits from Crestor.
“Competitors’ detailing” is defined as the average total number of detailing visits
to a physician per day, from Crestor’s approval date until a prescription date, made by
Crestor’s competitors. The variable measures competitors’ detailing intensity at each
physician before a prescription date. The average Competitors’ detailing is 0.145 visits
per day since Crestor’s approval.
The second set of variables we control for are a number of patient characteristics,
including gender, age, race, diagnosis types (new or ongoing), severity (mild, moderate
or severe), prescription types (new or renewal), and payment methods (Cash/Indemnity,
Medicaid, Medicare, HMO/PPO/POS). About 53 percent of visits are made by male
patients, and 44 percent are made by senior patients who are 65 or older. Asian and
Hispanic patients account for 2.4 percent and 5.6 percent, respectively, of all the patient
visits. Seventy-seven percent are considered to have moderate conditions, six percent
severe conditions, and the rest mild conditions. Nine percent of the cases are from a
new diagnosis. Patients differ in their payment method as well: 51 percent are covered
by HMO/PPO/POS; two percent and 39 percent of patients are covered by Medicaid
and Medicare respectively; and remaining payment types are either cash or indemnity.
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5 Empirical Results
Before discussing the estimation and test results, we first look at some patterns from
the raw data. Table 3 shows the prescriptions by drug and patient type, and Table
4 shows the shares of each dosage by patient types in cases in which Crestor is pre-
scribed. As expected, senior and Asian patients are less likely to be prescribed Crestor:
senior and Asian patients are prescribed Crestor 7.1 percent and 7.8 percent of the time
respectively, while the other patients are prescribed Crestor 11.1 percent of the time.
Furthermore, relative to the other patients, senior and Asian patients are less likely to
be prescribed the 20mg or 40mg dosages if Crestor is prescribed for them. These num-
bers indicate that, on average, physicians have, to some extent, become aware of the
contraindications of Crestor for senior and Asian patients by the end of our data period.
The question, then, is whether detailing constitutes a source of such information.
5.1 Baseline Empirical Results
5.1.1 Linear probability model of Crestor prescription
The estimation results of the linear probability model of Crestor prescription (1) are
reported in column one in Table 5. The dummies of Year*Month, which help con-
trol for the time trend in the average willingness to prescribe Crestor, are included
in the model but omitted from the table to save space. Our estimates are strikingly
clear. First, the coefficient of “After” is significantly positive, showing that detailing
significantly increases the prescription probability for patients for whom Crestor is not
contraindicated.
In addition, the overall effect of detailing for senior patients and Asian patients
is also positive and statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels respectively.8
This is consistent with findings in the literature using similar data and suggests that
detailing is, above all, an effective marketing tool. However, we are unable to conclude
whether detailing has a persuasive nature, because we cannot infer whether the detailing
exaggerated the true match utilities of Crestor.
8The overall impact of detailing on the prescription of Crestor to senior and Asian patients is measured
by the sum of the coefficients of “After” and “After*Senior” and the sum of the coefficients of “After” and
“After*Asian” respectively.
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Furthermore, for the coefficients of senior and Asian patient indicators (i.e., βt1 in
our empirical model), the former, but not the latter, is significantly negative, meaning
that senior patients are indeed less likely to be prescribed Crestor. This suggests that,
on average, physicians have some prior knowledge about the contraindication for senior
patients before being detailed.
More importantly, the coefficients of the interaction terms of “After*Senior” and
“After*Asian” (i.e., corresponding to βt3 in our empirical model) are also significantly
negative, meaning that the prescription probability of Crestor for the contraindicated
patients decreases relative to the other patients after the first detailing visit to each
physician. This suggests that detailing is, indeed, informative about contraindication,
as opposed to being a completely indiscriminate marketing tool.9
Lastly, the estimates of other coefficients seem reasonable. Patients with moderate
and severe symptoms are more likely to be prescribed Crestor, which is consistent with
Crestor’s exceptional power in lowering cholesterol levels. Physicians are also more
likely to prescribe Crestor in new prescriptions (relative to as renewals of previous
prescriptions) and for treating new diagnoses. The former finding is probably driven
by the simple fact that Crestor was newly introduced to the market, while the latter
suggests that, relative to existing diagnoses, physicians are more likely to try Crestor
when treating new diagnoses. The impact of competitors’ detailing is negative but
statistically insignificant. The negative impact shows the competition effect of other
companies’ detailing, and the statistical insignificance could be partly due to the fact
that the competing statin drugs have been on the market for a few years, so additional
detailing has only a small marginal effect.
9There can be Hawthorne effects, simply because the panel of physicians in our data report information
on their prescriptions and detailing to our data provider. However, with our focus on the interaction effects
of detailing and contraindications (as opposed to the main effect of detailing), the Hawthorne effect seems
unlikely to be the driver of our findings. In addition, pharmaceutical companies regularly observe physicians’
prescriptions through data obtained from ‘Health Information Organizations’. As a result, physicians have
always been under observation and, thus, are less likely subject to Hawthorne effects.
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5.1.2 Linear probability model of the high-dosage Crestor prescrip-
tion
Column two in Table 5 shows the estimation results of the linear probability model of the
high-dosage Crestor prescription. Focusing on high-dosage Crestor prescriptions yields
a few interesting findings. First, similarly, we find that detailing has a significantly pos-
itive impact on the prescription of high-dosage Crestor to non-contraindicated patients.
However, the detailing’s overall impact on the prescription of high-dosage Crestor to
senior (Asian) patients is negative (positive) but statistically insignificant. These re-
sults are in contrast to detailing’s overall significant positive impact on the prescription
of Crestor to senior and Asian patients, and they are consistent with Crestor being
cautious in marketing its high-dosage forms to senior and Asian patients.
In addition, the results lend further support to the informativeness of Crestor’s
detailing. In particular, the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms of “Af-
ter*Senior” and “After*Asian” are significantly negative, as in the linear probability
model of Crestor prescription.
5.1.3 Linear probability model with a more flexible specification for
the effect of detailing on senior Asian patients
The specifications in columns one and two in Table 5 are, a priori, restrictive for the
effect of detailing on senior Asian patients.10 In particular, the specifications do not
include the interaction terms of “Senior*Asian” and “After*Senior*Asian,”11 which im-
plies that the effect of detailing on senior Asian patients, relative to the main effect
captured by the coefficient of “After,” is simply the sum of the coefficients of “Af-
ter*Senior” and “After*Asian.”
To investigate the impact of the simplifying restriction, we estimate the linear pre-
scription probability models with the additional interaction terms and report the results
in columns three and four in Table 5. The estimates show that, for the prescriptions of
Crestor (of any dosage) and high-dosage Crestor, neither of the two additional interac-
tion terms is significant at any conventional levels, and the rest of the estimates in the
10Note that we refer to senior patients of Asian descent as “senior Asian patients” in this paper.
11We thank one of the referees for pointing out the issue.
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more flexible specifications are very close to the corresponding estimates in columns one
and two. The two additional interaction terms are also insignificant when we include the
fixed effects of physicians or physician*Year*Month (which we explore later). We note,
however, that there are only a small number of observations of senior Asian patients in
our data, which could (partly) explain our findings. Therefore, we note only that we
find no evidence of the effect of detailing on senior Asian patients being significantly
different from that implied by our original estimates (in columns one and two in Table
5), and we focus on the average effect of detailing on senior patients and Asian patients
separately for the rest of the paper.
In what follows, we first check the robustness of our results against the possibility
of detailing being endogenous and against the heterogeneity in the effect of detailing.
We then demonstrate the face validity of our test strategy by applying similar tests to
other non-contraindicated patient types.
5.2 Endogenous Detailing
Detailing might be endogenous, for example, due to targeted marketing and omitted
control variables. For evidence of correlation between detailing and physician-level in-
formation, Table 6 presents the results of linear regressions of three physician-level
detailing variables on “TotalRx,” the total number of statin prescriptions made per
physician from the start of 2003 until Aug 12, 2003 (the day before Crestor’s approval).
The three detailing variables are: Detailed (a binary variable indicating whether a
physician had been detailed by Crestor by the end of 2004); Delay (the number of days
from Crestor’s approval on Aug 13, 2003 until the first detailing visit by Crestor to
a physician); and Average competitors’ detailing (the average competitors’ detailing
intensity at each physician after Aug 13, 2003). The total number of statin prescrip-
tions per physician varies from zero to 591 and has a mean of 41, showing significant
heterogeneity in each physician’s relevance for Crestor. The regression results show
that physicians with higher statin prescription volumes 1) are more likely to have been
detailed by Crestor by the end 2004; 2) are detailed earlier by Crestor; and 3) are more
frequently detailed by the competing companies.
We take the panel-data fixed-effect approach to deal with the potential endogeneity
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in the companies’ detailing activities.12 In particular, we re-estimate the linear probabil-
ity models for Crestor and high-dosage Crestor prescriptions to allow for the physician
fixed effects. The fixed effects help control for such factors as physicians’ prescription
volumes and their willingness to prescribe new drugs. The results of the fixed-effect
regressions are presented in columns one and two in Table 7. The coefficient estimates
are in general similar to those reported for the models without the physician fixed ef-
fects. Importantly, the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms (“After*Senior”
and “After*Asian”) are all negative, with magnitude and statistical significance similar
to those reported in Table 5. Thus, the estimates of these coefficients of main interest
to us are robust to controlling for physician fixed effects.
Meanwhile, a few coefficients have noticeably different point estimates after control-
ling for physician fixed effects: 1) the coefficients of “After” are positive but smaller and
statistically less significant; 2) the coefficients of Competitors’ detailing are negative,
larger in magnitude and statistically more significant; and 3) the coefficients of Senior
patient indicators turn out to be positive and statistically insignificant. The direction
of corrections in the coefficients of the detailing variables (“After” and “Competitors’
detailing”) show that omitting the physician fixed effects leads to an overestimation of
the effect of Crestor’s detailing and an underestimation of the competition effect of the
other companies’ detailing. This pattern is consistent with Crestor and its competitors
targeting their detailing effort at physicians with higher willingness to prescribe Crestor.
The fact that the coefficients of the senior patient indicator become insignificant after
controlling for the physician fixed effects suggests that physicians’ willingness to pre-
scribe Crestor is related to how often they treat senior patients. Overall, these results
confirm the robustness of our main findings that Crestor’s detailing signaled an infe-
rior match quality of Crestor, especially the high-dosage forms, for the contraindicated
patients relative to the other patients.
A potential concern about the above analysis is that the trend in the willingness
12The instrumental-variable (IV) approach could also be applied, in principle, to deal with the endogeneity
problem here. For example, the one-year lagged competitors’ detailing intensity on the same calendar day
could be an IV for the current competitors’ detailing intensity. We, however, cannot take the approach here
because it would require data from 2002, which are not included in our data. In addition, it seems also
challenging to find an instrument for the variable “After” within our data.
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to prescribe Crestor may be different across physicians (due, for example, to expo-
sure to different sources of information) and, thus, cannot be fully controlled for by
the dummy variables of Year*Month. Individual physicians’ evolving attitude toward
Crestor affects their prescription decisions and can also affect the competitors’ detailing
intensity and the timing of Crestor’s first detailing visit to each physician. To address
this concern, we re-estimate the linear probability models to allow for the fixed effects of
physician*Year*Month. We report the estimation results in columns three and four in
Table 7. Overall, adding the additional fixed effects has little impact on our estimates,
and the qualitative results of all the tests remain the same. Therefore, we conclude
that our finding of Crestor’s detailing being informative is robust to physician-specific
trends in the attitude toward Crestor.
Lastly, it is worth noting the limitations in our fixed-effect approach to dealing with
the endogeneity in detailing. For example, our conclusion above would be wrong if the
following hypothetical scenario were true. In particular, suppose that Crestor detailers
somehow know when certain physicians are about to decrease their prescriptions to
contraindicated patients. At that moment, they visit the physicians to prevent the
decrease. However, the physicians are going to decrease such prescriptions in any case,
and the detailers always fail to change their behavior. Then, with our fixed effects, we
would still find that after the detailing visits, the physicians decrease prescriptions to
the contraindicated patients. However, the detailers were actually trying to mislead,
which is the opposite of our conclusion. Even though this kind of hypothetical scenario
seems unlikely to us, readers should keep the caveat in mind when interpreting our
results. Note also that our analysis depends mainly on the estimated effect of detailing
on particular contraindicated patients relative to that on the other patients. This
particular focus should make our results less sensitive to minor endogeneity problems
in detailing.
5.3 The Heterogeneity in the Effect of Detailing
Previous studies (e.g., Narayanan and Manchanda (2009)) find that the effect of de-
tailing varies significantly across physicians. It would be interesting to know whether
and how the effect of detailing varies across physicians in our data, especially for the
contraindicated patients. Here, we focus on analyzing how this effect varies across
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physicians by their prescription volumes for statins. For this purpose, we extend the
prescription probability models by adding the interaction terms of “After*TotalRx,”
“After*Senior*TotalRx” and “After*Asian*TotalRx.” We focus on the specifications
with fixed effects and report the estimates in Table 8.
The estimates show interesting heterogeneity in the effect of detailing. First, while
the coefficients of “After” are significantly positive in all four models, the coefficients
of “After*TotalRx” are negative in all four models and statistically significant in all
cases except for the one for high-dosage Crestor in the last column (with the fixed
effects of Physician*Year*Month). These estimates show that, while the main effect
of detailing on Crestor prescription is positive for most physicians, it is significantly
weaker for physicians with larger prescription volumes. Second, the coefficients of “Af-
ter*Senior” and “After*Asian” are again all significantly negative. Yet the coefficients of
“After*Senior*TotalRx” and “After*Asian*TotalRx” are all positive (but statistically
insignificant, with only the coefficients of “After*Senior*TotalRx” being significant at
the 10% level).13 Intuitively, these estimates suggest that the informative effect of de-
tailing for the contraindicated patients is significant but somewhat weaker for physicians
with larger prescription volumes.
One possible explanation of the above findings is that physicians with higher pre-
scription volumes simply are not paying as much attention to detailers due to their
busier schedule and limited attention capacity. Another possible explanation is that
physicians with higher prescription volumes are more knowledgeable about the efficacy
and the contraindications of statin drugs (including Crestor) and, thus, are less likely to
be affected by detailing. It would be interesting to distinguish between these different
explanations. The task is, however, challenging for us due to data limitations and, thus,
we leave them to future research.
5.4 Validity Checks: Evidence from “Placebo Tests”
The above tests of the informativeness of detailing are based on observable contraindi-
cated groups of patients. The underlying argument is that if detailing were informative,
13As we noted earlier, our data include more physicians with higher prescription volumes relative to the
whole U.S. population of physicians. The findings here also imply that the oversampling of high-volume
prescribers makes it harder to detect informative detailing.
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we should be able to find that it signals the inferior match quality of Crestor for the con-
traindicated patients. In this subsection, we use placebo tests to check the face validity
of our basic test idea. In these placebo tests, we show that the observed patterns of
the coefficients in our analysis above disappear if we conduct the same tests on Crestor
with patient groups that are not specifically contraindicated.
First, we look at the prescription of Crestor to male patients, who, as a group are not
specifically contraindicated for Crestor. The estimates of the models, including dummy
variables and interaction terms for male patients, are presented in Table 9. The first and
second columns show the estimates of the baseline specification of the linear probability
models for the prescription of Crestor and high-dosage Crestor; the specifications in
columns three and four add the physician fixed effects; and the specifications in the last
two columns add the fixed effects of physician*Year*Month.
The coefficient of the male indicator is significantly negative in all three specifica-
tions of the model for Crestor prescription, but it is not statistically significant in any
specification of the model of high-dosage Crestor prescription. More importantly, the
interaction term “After*Male” is not significant in either statistical or economic terms
in any specification of the two models. Thus, although male patients are less likely
prescribed Crestor for some reason, the pattern seems unrelated to Crestor’s detailing;
and gender is irrelevant to the prescription of high-dosage Crestor, unlike what we find
for the contraindicated patients. Therefore, overall, the results show no evidence that
detailing is signaling a different match quality of Crestor for male patients, as we would
expect in this placebo test.
We further replicate the same exercise for Hispanic patients. The estimates of the
models are presented in Table 10. The coefficients of the Hispanic patient indicator and
the interaction term “After*Hispanic” is not significant in either statistical or economic
terms in any specification of the two models. These results are consistent with the fact
that Crestor is not specifically contraindicated for Hispanic patients.
To summarize this section, first, our test results presented strong evidence indicating
that detailing actually is informative; second, the results are robust to the possibility of
detailing being correlated with physician-specific unobserved factors; finally, the validity
of our tests is supported by the results that we found by conducting similar tests for
other irrelevant cases.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examined the potential beneficial role of pharmaceutical detailing in
informing the prescription process. As profit-driven as detailing is, we find some strong
evidence showing that it is also informative about the negative features of the drug being
promoted. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which regulates pharmaceutical
advertising and drug labeling in the United States, requires promotional statements
to present “a fair balance between information relating to side effects and contraindi-
cations and information relating to effectiveness of the drug.” The Act also requires
that “the presentation of true information relating to side effects and contraindications
is comparable in depth and detail with the claims for effectiveness or safety.”14 Even
though the documents/material left by detailers are legally treated as labels and, thus,
are subject to the same regulation, oral promotional statements by detailers are cur-
rently not regulated.15 Our findings are thus important for the debate over potential
regulation of the pharmaceutical industry’s detailing activities.
In the meantime, our findings also raise the question of why self-interested phar-
maceutical companies and sales representatives should actively reveal such negative
information about their own drugs. The regulation on the print material that detail-
ers provide creates some incentive for them to be informative. There can be more
information on the efficacy and safety in the print material if it is balanced by suffi-
cient information on side effects and contraindications. Reputation could be another
mechanism that leads to informative detailing. Detailers want to inform doctors of
the contraindications if doing so helps them maintain good relationships with doctors
and/or helps build doctors’ trust in them. Competition in the market can make such
goodwill with doctors even more valuable, and detailers would also want to avoid the
negative information being exploited by competitors to undermine their credibility.16
An empirical analysis of the mechanism(s) underlying detailers’ ”self-discipline” would
further inform the controversy surrounding pharmaceutical marketing. However, an-
14Source: https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/CFRSearch.cfm?fr=202.1, part (d)
(5) ii in Section 202.1 “Prescription-drug advertisements”
15This may partly explains the industry’s increasing reliance on detailers for promotions.
16Related to this argument, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) shows that media companies, which care about
the reputation of their news quality, are less biased when there is more competition.
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swers to such questions are beyond the scope of the current paper, and we leave them
to our future research.
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Tables
Table 1: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
Crestor (any dosage) Indicator of Crestor (of any dosage) being prescribed
High-dosage Crestor Indicator of High-dosage (20mg or 40mg) Crestor being prescribed
Moderate Indicator of moderate symptoms
Severe Indicator of severe symptoms
New prescription Indicator of a new prescription
New diagnosis Indicator of a new diagnosis
Medicare Indicator of a patient covered by Medicare
Medicaid Indicator of a patient covered by Medicaid
HMO/PPO/POS Indicator of a patient covered by a HMO/PPO/POS plan
Competitors’ detailing The average total number of detailing visits per day by competitors
Male Indicator of a patient being male
Senior Indicator of a patient being older than 65
Asian Indicator of a patient being of Asian descent
Hispanic Indicator of a patient being of Hispanic descent
After Indicator of a time after the first detailing visit by Crestor to a physician
Senior*Asian Interaction of Senior and Asian
After*Senior Interaction of After and Senior
After*Asian Interaction of After and Asian
After*Hispanic Interaction of After and Hispanic
TotalRx Total number of statin-class prescriptions per physician in 2003 before Crestor launch
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Crestor (any dosage) 0.093 0.29 0 1 227282
High-dosage Crestor 0.013 0.112 0 1 227282
Moderate 0.773 0.419 0 1 227282
Severe 0.064 0.245 0 1 227282
New prescription 0.167 0.373 0 1 227282
New diagnosis 0.089 0.285 0 1 227282
Medicare 0.392 0.488 0 1 227282
Medicaid 0.024 0.153 0 1 227282
HMO/PPO/POS 0.511 0.5 0 1 227282
Competitors’ detailing 0.145 0.153 0 2.667 227282
Male 0.533 0.499 0 1 227282
Senior 0.444 0.497 0 1 227282
Asian 0.024 0.153 0 1 227282
Senior Asian 0.009 0.095 0 1 227282
Hispanic 0.056 0.23 0 1 227282
After 0.866 0.341 0 1 227282
After*Senior 0.384 0.486 0 1 227282
After*Asian 0.021 0.144 0 1 227282
After*Senior Asian 0.008 0.09 0 1 227282
After*Hispanic 0.049 0.217 0 1 227282
TotalRx 0.107 0.112 0 0.591 227282
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Table 3: Prescription to Contraindicated Patients and Other Patients
Senior Patients Asian Patients Other Patients
Drugs Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Crestor 7,032 7.12 428 7.83 13,618 11.07
Other Drugs 91,731 92.88 5,036 92.17 109,437 88.93
Table 4: The Strength of Crestor Prescribed to Contraindicated Patients and Other Patients
Senior Patients Asian Patients Other Patients
Strength Percentage Percentage Percentage
5mg 4.08 4.91 2.58
10mg 82.82 85.51 83.22
20mg 11.15 9.11 12.00
40mg 1.95 0.47 2.20
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Table 5: Prescription of Crestor to Senior and Asian Patients: the Impact of Detailing
Crestor (any
dosage)
High-dosage
Crestor
Crestor (any
dosage)
High-dosage
Crestor
Moderate 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.00488∗∗∗ 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.00488∗∗∗
(0.00464) (0.000930) (0.00464) (0.000930)
Severe 0.126∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗
(0.00970) (0.00444) (0.00970) (0.00444)
New prescription 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗
(0.00851) (0.00197) (0.00851) (0.00197)
New diagnosis 0.0253∗∗ -0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0253∗∗ -0.0121∗∗∗
(0.00918) (0.00182) (0.00918) (0.00182)
Medicare -0.00968 0.00119 -0.00962 0.00124
(0.00774) (0.00194) (0.00774) (0.00194)
Medicaid -0.0405∗∗∗ -0.00404 -0.0405∗∗∗ -0.00406
(0.00911) (0.00254) (0.00911) (0.00254)
HMO/PPO/POS -0.0234∗∗ -0.000443 -0.0234∗∗ -0.000426
(0.00719) (0.00170) (0.00719) (0.00170)
Male -0.00896∗∗∗ 0.000633 -0.00896∗∗∗ 0.000633
(0.00204) (0.000595) (0.00204) (0.000596)
Competitors’ detailing -0.000416 0.000887 -0.000407 0.000893
(0.0202) (0.00556) (0.0202) (0.00556)
After 0.0532∗∗∗ 0.00594∗∗∗ 0.0531∗∗∗ 0.00604∗∗∗
(0.00711) (0.00138) (0.00711) (0.00138)
Senior -0.0127∗∗ -0.00210 -0.0129∗∗ -0.00205
(0.00502) (0.00163) (0.00504) (0.00163)
Asian 0.00340 0.00438 -0.000960 0.00587
(0.0124) (0.00380) (0.0149) (0.00524)
After*Senior -0.0273∗∗∗ -0.00501∗∗ -0.0271∗∗∗ -0.00523∗∗
(0.00450) (0.00157) (0.00453) (0.00159)
After*Asian -0.0249∗ -0.0111∗∗ -0.0223 -0.0148∗∗
(0.0143) (0.00411) (0.0170) (0.00558)
Senior Asian 0.0126 -0.00432
(0.0196) (0.00723)
After*Senior Asian -0.00810 0.0101
(0.0204) (0.00761)
Constant 0.0739∗∗ 0.00624 0.0740∗∗ 0.00618
(0.0345) (0.00474) (0.0345) (0.00474)
Year*Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 227282 227282 227282 227282
Adjusted (R2) 0.053 0.016 0.053 0.016
Notes: 1. Standard errors (clustered at the physician level) in parentheses; 2. * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 6: The Detailing by Crestor and Physicians’ Prescription Volumes
Detailed Delay Average competitors’ detailing
TotalRx (1,000) 2.519∗∗∗ -1880.7∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗
(0.257) (138.7) (0.100)
TotalRx (1,000) - squared -4.975∗∗∗ 4051.2∗∗∗ -1.400∗∗∗
(0.809) (552.3) (0.412)
Constant 0.692∗∗∗ 167.0∗∗∗ 0.0507∗∗∗
(0.0123) (5.463) (0.00251)
N 2400 1842 2057
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.198 0.165
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses; 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
3. “Detailed” is a binary variable that equals one if there was a Crestor detailing visit to a physician before
the end of 2004 and equals zero otherwise; ”Delay” is the number of days from the Crestor’s approval date of
Aug 13, 2003 until the first detailing visit by Crestor to a physician; and Average competitors’ detailing is the
competitors’ detailing intensity at each physician averaged across the days from Aug 13, 2003 until the end of
2004.
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Table 7: Prescription of Crestor to Senior and Asian Patients: the Impact of Detailing
Crestor (any
dosage)
High-dosage
Crestor
Crestor (any
dosage)
High-dosage
Crestor
Moderate 0.0479∗∗∗ 0.00887∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗ 0.00843∗∗∗
(0.00335) (0.00128) (0.00341) (0.00128)
Severe 0.153∗∗∗ 0.0513∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.0509∗∗∗
(0.00884) (0.00416) (0.00891) (0.00414)
New prescription 0.0968∗∗∗ 0.00796∗∗∗ 0.0970∗∗∗ 0.00835∗∗∗
(0.00565) (0.00139) (0.00565) (0.00141)
New diagnosis 0.0198∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗
(0.00656) (0.00146) (0.00653) (0.00152)
Medicare -0.0205∗∗∗ -0.000226 -0.0194∗∗∗ -0.000356
(0.00403) (0.00163) (0.00404) (0.00166)
Medicaid -0.0400∗∗∗ -0.00493∗∗ -0.0399∗∗∗ -0.00460∗
(0.00637) (0.00242) (0.00636) (0.00241)
HMO/PPO/POS -0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0000564 -0.0128∗∗∗ -0.0000953
(0.00345) (0.00132) (0.00343) (0.00134)
Male -0.00823∗∗∗ 0.000656 -0.00839∗∗∗ 0.000615
(0.00166) (0.000556) (0.00166) (0.000565)
Competitors’ detailing -0.0361∗∗ -0.0151 -0.0291∗ -0.00375
(0.0169) (0.00929) (0.0150) (0.00316)
After 0.0304∗∗∗ 0.00314∗ 0.0298∗∗∗ 0.00456∗∗
(0.00476) (0.00169) (0.00437) (0.00171)
Senior 0.00480 0.000415 0.00375 0.000113
(0.00327) (0.00142) (0.00321) (0.00141)
Asian 0.0127 0.00491 0.0178∗ 0.00572
(0.0111) (0.00374) (0.0100) (0.00367)
After*Senior -0.0216∗∗∗ -0.00434∗∗∗ -0.0216∗∗∗ -0.00405∗∗
(0.00316) (0.00129) (0.00314) (0.00129)
After*Asian -0.0185 -0.0107∗∗ -0.0238∗∗ -0.0115∗∗
(0.0115) (0.00404) (0.0109) (0.00405)
Constant 0.0274∗ 0.00586 -0.0344∗∗ -0.00993∗∗
(0.0152) (0.00515) (0.0160) (0.00502)
Year*Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Physician FE Yes Yes No No
Physician*Year*Month FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 227282 227282 227282 227282
Adjusted (R2) 0.045 0.015 0.038 0.011
Notes: 1. Standard errors (clustered at the physician level) in parentheses; 2. * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 8: Heterogeneous Detailing Effect Across Physicians
Crestor (any
dosage)
High-dosage
Crestor
Crestor (any
dosage)
High-dosage
Crestor
Moderate 0.0479∗∗∗ 0.00887∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗ 0.00843∗∗∗
(0.00335) (0.00128) (0.00341) (0.00128)
Severe 0.153∗∗∗ 0.0513∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.0509∗∗∗
(0.00884) (0.00416) (0.00891) (0.00414)
New prescription 0.0968∗∗∗ 0.00797∗∗∗ 0.0970∗∗∗ 0.00835∗∗∗
(0.00565) (0.00139) (0.00565) (0.00141)
New diagnosis 0.0197∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗
(0.00655) (0.00146) (0.00653) (0.00152)
Medicare -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.000145 -0.0191∗∗∗ -0.000282
(0.00404) (0.00163) (0.00405) (0.00166)
Medicaid -0.0400∗∗∗ -0.00494∗∗ -0.0398∗∗∗ -0.00460∗
(0.00638) (0.00242) (0.00637) (0.00241)
HMO/PPO/POS -0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0000806 -0.0127∗∗∗ -0.0000659
(0.00345) (0.00132) (0.00343) (0.00134)
Male -0.00824∗∗∗ 0.000656 -0.00842∗∗∗ 0.000613
(0.00166) (0.000557) (0.00166) (0.000566)
Competitors’ detailing -0.0393∗∗ -0.0156∗ -0.0309∗∗ -0.00383
(0.0168) (0.00925) (0.0150) (0.00317)
After 0.0447∗∗∗ 0.00532∗∗ 0.0412∗∗∗ 0.00521∗∗
(0.00583) (0.00211) (0.00545) (0.00206)
After*TotalRx -0.177∗∗∗ -0.0271∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.00773
(0.0323) (0.0102) (0.0268) (0.00804)
Senior 0.00379 0.000174 0.00300 -0.0000194
(0.00329) (0.00143) (0.00322) (0.00142)
Asian 0.0120 0.00364 0.0179∗ 0.00453
(0.0112) (0.00403) (0.0101) (0.00391)
Senior Asian 0.00182 0.00372 -0.000443 0.00330
(0.00824) (0.00235) (0.00813) (0.00227)
After*Senior -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.00462∗∗ -0.0245∗∗∗ -0.00435∗∗
(0.00361) (0.00143) (0.00361) (0.00144)
After*Asian -0.0248∗∗ -0.0119∗∗ -0.0300∗∗ -0.0126∗∗
(0.0125) (0.00457) (0.0120) (0.00459)
After*Senior*TotalRx 0.0319∗ 0.00359 0.0314∗ 0.00281
(0.0166) (0.00540) (0.0164) (0.00530)
After*Asian*TotalRx 0.0569 0.00967 0.0566 0.0107
(0.0406) (0.0128) (0.0402) (0.0128)
Constant 0.0318∗∗ 0.00658 -0.0338∗∗ -0.00989∗∗
(0.0151) (0.00514) (0.0159) (0.00502)
Year*Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Physician FE Yes Yes No No
Physician*Year*Month FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 227282 227282 227282 227282
Adjusted (R2) 0.045 0.015 0.038 0.011
Notes: 1. Standard errors (clustered at the physician level) in parentheses; 2. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 9: Prescription of Crestor to Male Patients: A Placebo Test
Crestor (any
dosage)
High-dosage
Crestor
Crestor (any
dosage)
High-dosage
Crestor
Crestor (any
dosage)
High-dosage
Crestor
Moderate 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.00488∗∗∗ 0.0478∗∗∗ 0.00886∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗ 0.00842∗∗∗
(0.00464) (0.000930) (0.00335) (0.00128) (0.00341) (0.00128)
Severe 0.126∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.0513∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.0509∗∗∗
(0.00971) (0.00444) (0.00884) (0.00416) (0.00891) (0.00414)
New prescription 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0968∗∗∗ 0.00796∗∗∗ 0.0970∗∗∗ 0.00835∗∗∗
(0.00851) (0.00197) (0.00565) (0.00139) (0.00565) (0.00141)
New diagnosis 0.0253∗∗ -0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0198∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗
(0.00918) (0.00182) (0.00656) (0.00146) (0.00654) (0.00152)
Medicare -0.0100 0.00114 -0.0208∗∗∗ -0.000290 -0.0198∗∗∗ -0.000417
(0.00773) (0.00194) (0.00404) (0.00163) (0.00405) (0.00166)
Medicaid -0.0408∗∗∗ -0.00410 -0.0404∗∗∗ -0.00499∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗ -0.00466∗
(0.00912) (0.00254) (0.00638) (0.00242) (0.00636) (0.00241)
HMO/PPO/POS -0.0235∗∗ -0.000460 -0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0000267 -0.0130∗∗∗ -0.000124
(0.00720) (0.00170) (0.00346) (0.00132) (0.00344) (0.00134)
Male -0.00944∗∗ -0.000716 -0.00882∗∗∗ -0.000704 -0.00932∗∗∗ -0.000424
(0.00295) (0.000797) (0.00255) (0.000817) (0.00253) (0.000800)
Competitors’ detailing -0.000490 0.000884 -0.0357∗∗ -0.0151 -0.0288∗ -0.00379
(0.0202) (0.00557) (0.0170) (0.00930) (0.0150) (0.00316)
After 0.0401∗∗∗ 0.00262∗ 0.0199∗∗∗ 0.0000900 0.0187∗∗∗ 0.00178
(0.00626) (0.00138) (0.00464) (0.00187) (0.00436) (0.00196)
Senior -0.0361∗∗∗ -0.00641∗∗∗ -0.0138∗∗∗ -0.00332∗∗ -0.0148∗∗∗ -0.00337∗∗
(0.00445) (0.00136) (0.00265) (0.00104) (0.00264) (0.00105)
Asian -0.0186∗∗ -0.00540∗∗∗ -0.00348 -0.00450∗∗ -0.00301 -0.00435∗∗
(0.00814) (0.00148) (0.00507) (0.00150) (0.00504) (0.00149)
After*Male 0.000577 0.00156 0.000686 0.00156 0.00107 0.00119
(0.00375) (0.00106) (0.00312) (0.00104) (0.00310) (0.00103)
Constant 0.0858∗∗ 0.00928∗ 0.0369∗∗ 0.00862∗ -0.0246 -0.00745
(0.0350) (0.00480) (0.0150) (0.00518) (0.0158) (0.00501)
Year*Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Physician FE No No Yes Yes No No
Physician*Year*Month FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 227282 227282 227282 227282 227282 227282
Adjusted (R2) 0.053 0.016 0.044 0.015 0.038 0.011
Notes: 1. Standard errors (clustered at the physician level) in parentheses; 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.
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Table 10: Prescription of Crestor to Hispanic Patients: A Placebo Test
Crestor (any
dosage)
High-dosage
Crestor
Crestor (any
dosage)
High-dosage
Crestor
Crestor (any
dosage)
High-dosage
Crestor
Moderate 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.00489∗∗∗ 0.0478∗∗∗ 0.00886∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗ 0.00842∗∗∗
(0.00465) (0.000932) (0.00335) (0.00128) (0.00341) (0.00128)
Severe 0.126∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.0513∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.0509∗∗∗
(0.00971) (0.00444) (0.00884) (0.00416) (0.00891) (0.00414)
New prescription 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0968∗∗∗ 0.00796∗∗∗ 0.0970∗∗∗ 0.00835∗∗∗
(0.00851) (0.00197) (0.00565) (0.00139) (0.00565) (0.00141)
New diagnosis 0.0254∗∗ -0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0198∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗
(0.00919) (0.00182) (0.00656) (0.00146) (0.00653) (0.00152)
Medicare -0.0107 0.00103 -0.0208∗∗∗ -0.000295 -0.0198∗∗∗ -0.000422
(0.00767) (0.00191) (0.00404) (0.00163) (0.00405) (0.00166)
Medicaid -0.0400∗∗∗ -0.00398 -0.0404∗∗∗ -0.00499∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗ -0.00466∗
(0.00914) (0.00253) (0.00638) (0.00242) (0.00636) (0.00241)
HMO/PPO/POS -0.0233∗∗ -0.000430 -0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0000282 -0.0130∗∗∗ -0.000125
(0.00719) (0.00170) (0.00346) (0.00132) (0.00343) (0.00134)
Hispanic -0.00534 -0.000457 -0.00144 -0.00184 -0.00418 -0.00304
(0.00776) (0.00201) (0.00640) (0.00294) (0.00594) (0.00297)
Male -0.00903∗∗∗ 0.000623 -0.00822∗∗∗ 0.000655 -0.00839∗∗∗ 0.000613
(0.00203) (0.000593) (0.00166) (0.000556) (0.00166) (0.000565)
Competitors’ detailing 0.00125 0.00115 -0.0358∗∗ -0.0151 -0.0290∗ -0.00386
(0.0201) (0.00560) (0.0170) (0.00931) (0.0151) (0.00315)
After 0.0407∗∗∗ 0.00352∗∗ 0.0201∗∗∗ 0.000844 0.0190∗∗∗ 0.00226
(0.00643) (0.00131) (0.00443) (0.00167) (0.00403) (0.00173)
Senior -0.0355∗∗∗ -0.00631∗∗∗ -0.0138∗∗∗ -0.00332∗∗ -0.0148∗∗∗ -0.00337∗∗
(0.00433) (0.00133) (0.00265) (0.00104) (0.00264) (0.00105)
Asian -0.0194∗∗ -0.00552∗∗∗ -0.00331 -0.00452∗∗ -0.00277 -0.00437∗∗
(0.00817) (0.00150) (0.00509) (0.00149) (0.00506) (0.00148)
After*Hispanic -0.00800 -0.00160 0.00307 0.00183 0.00659 0.00326
(0.0121) (0.00287) (0.00746) (0.00302) (0.00706) (0.00307)
Constant 0.0855∗∗ 0.00851∗ 0.0366∗∗ 0.00795 -0.0249 -0.00786
(0.0346) (0.00474) (0.0151) (0.00514) (0.0159) (0.00496)
Year*Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Physician FE No No Yes Yes No No
Physician*Year*Month FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 227282 227282 227282 227282 227282 227282
Adjusted (R2) 0.053 0.016 0.044 0.015 0.037 0.011
Notes: 1. Standard errors (clustered at the physician level) in parentheses; 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.
